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Assessing the Control-Theory
J E N S DAV I D O H L I N , E L I E S VA N S L I E D R E GT, AND T H O M AS W E I G E N D ∗

Abstract
As the ﬁrst cases before the ICC proceed to the Appeals Chamber, the judges ought to critically evaluate the merits and demerits of the control-theory of perpetratorship and its related
doctrines. The request for a possible recharacterization of the form of responsibility in the case
of Katanga and the recent acquittal of Ngudjolo can be taken as indications that the controltheory is problematic as a theory of liability. The authors, in a spirit of constructive criticism,
invite the ICC Appeals Chamber to take this unique opportunity to reconsider or improve the
control-theory as developed by the Pre-Trial Chambers in the Lubanga and Katanga cases.
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1. I NTRODUCTION
The conviction of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo of 14 March 2012 marked an important
moment in the ICC’s history.1 It was the ﬁrst judgment by an ICC Trial Chamber.
Lubanga was found guilty of having committed the war crime of enlisting and
conscripting child soldiers and sentenced to 14 years’ imprisonment.2
On 18 December 2012, the ICC issued its second judgment, this time an acquittal.
Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui was acquitted of charges for crimes against humanity and
war crimes committed during an attack on Bogoro village in the DRC.3 Both the Lubanga conviction and the Ngudjolo acquittal came with vigorous dissents with regard
to the ‘control theory’ of liability for perpetration.4 This theory, developed by the
Pre-Trial Chambers in Lubanga and Katanga and Ngudjolo centres upon the concept
of ‘control’ as marking a distinction between principal liability and accessorial liability and is based on the assertion that Article 25(3) of the ICC Statute provides

∗
1
2
3
4

Associate Professor of Law, Cornell Law School [jdo43@cornell.edu]; Professor of Criminal Law, Vrije
Universiteit Amsterdam [e.van.sliedregt@vu.nl]; Professor of Criminal Law, University of Cologne
[Thomas.Weigend@uni-koeln.de], respectively.
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Judgment, Trial Chamber I, ICC-01/04–01/06, 14 March 2012 (hereinafter
Lubanga judgment).
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on Sentence pursuant to Article 76 of the Statute, Trial Chamber
I, ICC-01/04-01/06, 10 July 2012.
Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Jugement rendu en application de l’article 74 du Statut, Trial Chamber II,
ICC-01/04-02/12, 18 December 2012 (hereinafter Ngudjolo judgment/acquittal).
Separate Opinion of Judge Adrian Fulford to Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Judgment, Trial Chamber I,
ICC-01/04-01/06, 14 March 2012 (hereinafter Separate and Dissenting Opinion Judge Fulford); Concurring
Opinion of Judge Christine van den Wyngaert to Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Jugement rendu en
application de l’article 74 du Statut, Trial Chamber II, ICC-01/04-02/12, 18 December 2012 (hereinafter
Concurring Opinion Judge Van den Wyngaert).
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for a hierarchical structure of the modes of participation. According to the Pre-Trial
Chamber in Lubanga, this hierarchical structure implies that co-perpetration, as
principal liability, requires proof of an essential contribution to the common plan
that resulted in the commission of the crime.5
The control-theory has its source in the writings of criminal-law scholar
Claus Roxin, who attempted to devise a theory for holding Nazi leaders such as
Adolf Eichmann responsible as perpetrators of the atrocities committed under their
regime.6 At the ICC and beyond, the control-theory has remained controversial. The
control-theory can, however, be credited for promoting fair labelling.7 But Judge
Fulford, in his separate opinion in Lubanga, opines that the control-theory (i) is
unsupported by the text of the Statute, (ii) does not create a hierarchy of liability,
and (iii) that joint perpetration does not require an essential contribution of each
co-perpetrator. The latter requirement, in his view, would set too high a threshold
for liability. He argues in favour of a plain-text reading of Article 25(3)(a) of the ICC
Statute and, with regard to joint perpetration, proposes that a contribution to the
crime is ‘[d]irect or indirect, provided either way there is a causal link between the
individual’s contribution and the crime’.8
Judge Van den Wyngaert, in her opinion in the Ngudjolo decision of acquittal,
agrees with Fulford that the control-theory is not consistent with the ordinary
meaning of Article 25(3)(a) of the ICC Statute and that Article 25(3) does not create
a hierarchy of blameworthiness. With regard to the requirement of an essential
contribution, she is of the view that:
[f]or joint perpetration, there must, in my view, be a direct contribution to the realisation
of the material elements of the crime. This follows from the very concept of joint
perpetration. Under Article 25(3)(a), only persons who have committed a crime together
can be held responsible. The essence of committing a crime is bringing about its material
elements.9

Van den Wyngaert is further critical of the combination of joint perpetration and
indirect perpetration into ‘indirect co-perpetration’. This combined form of liability
has been developed by the Pre-Trial Chamber in Katanga and Ngudjolo with the
purpose of capturing complex forms of collective violence. To Van den Wyngaert’s
mind, this theory, which presupposes an organized structure of power that uses
(‘controls’) individuals as tools to commit crimes, conﬂicts with the text of Article
25(3) of the ICC Statute and Article 22 of the ICC Statute.
Contrary to the approach favoured by Judges Fulford and Van den Wyngaert,
judicial practice at the ICC, at least so far, has demonstrated a penchant for judicial
5
6

7

8
9

Lubanga judgment, para. 999.
C. Roxin, ‘Straftaten im Rahmen organisatorischer Machtsapparate’, Goltdammer’s Archiv für Strafrecht (GA)
(1963), translated to English: C. Roxin, ‘Crimes as Part of Organized Power Structures’, (2011) 9 JICJ, 193–205.
See also C. Roxin, Täterschaft und Tatherrschaft (2006), at 242–52, 704–17; C. Roxin, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil,
Vol. 2 (2003), 46 et seq.
See D. Guilfoyle, ‘Responsibility for Collective Atrocities: Fair Labelling and Approaches to Commission in
International Criminal Law, (2011) 64 Current Legal Problems 1, at 6. See E. van Sliedregt, ‘The Curious Case
of International Criminal Liability’, (2012) 10 JICJ 1171,at 1182–85.
Separate and Dissenting Opinion Judge Fulford, para. 16.
Concurring Opinion Judge Van den Wyngaert, para. 44.
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activism and creativity. This stands in contrast to the textual approach one would
expect, given the fact the ICC Statute contains elaborate statutory deﬁnitions, a
general part, and extensive Elements of Crimes. Article 21 of the Statute primarily
refers the judges to these sources rather than to general rules that may be found in
domestic laws.
In this paper, we will not discuss the question whether there exists a sufﬁcient
legal basis for the control-theory; this has been done elsewhere.10 We instead wish
to appraise the substance of control-theory. We will focus primarily on two of its
manifestations: joint perpetration and indirect co-perpetration. Third, we discuss
the alleged hierarchy in Article 25(3) of the ICC Statute, on which some aspects of
control-theory have been based.

2. J OINT PERPETRATION AND THE ‘ ESSENTIAL CONTRIBUTION ’
2.1. Control-theory and joint perpetration
With respect to joint perpetration, the Pre-Trial Chamber in Lubanga deﬁned ‘control’ as ‘joint control over the crime by reason of the essential nature of the various
contributions to the commission of the crime’.11 The Chamber recognized that in
cases of joint perpetration none of the perpetrators normally ‘controls’ the commission of the offence by himself, because the deﬁning feature of co-perpetration is a
division of labour.12 But
when the objective elements of an offence are carried out by a plurality of persons acting
within the framework of a common plan, only those to whom essential tasks have been
assigned – and who, consequently, have the power to frustrate the commission of the
crime by not performing their tasks – can be said to have joint control over the crime.13

The deﬁning feature of joint perpetration, according to the Chamber’s deﬁnition,
is a hypothetical power, namely ‘the power to frustrate the commission of the crime
by not performing their tasks’.14 Because this decisive criterion is framed in negative
terms (‘frustrating’ by ‘not performing’), there exists no particular afﬁrmative act
that a person must perform in order to become a joint perpetrator. The Lubanga
Trial Chamber indeed emphasized that a person can be a co-perpetrator even where
he does not physically perpetrate any of the elements of the crime in question and

10

11

12

13
14

S. Manacorda and C. Meloni, ‘Indirect Perpetration versus Joint Criminal Enterprise: Concurring Approaches
in the Practice of International Criminal Law?’, (2011) 9 JICJ 159. See also T. Weigend, ‘Perpetration through
an Organization: The Unexpected Career of a German Legal Concept’, (2011) 9 JICJ 91. E. van Sliedregt,
Individual Criminal Responsibility in International Law (2012), 83–8.
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on the Conﬁrmation of Charges, Pre-Trial Chamber, ICC01/04-01/06, 29 January 2007, para. 341 (emphasis added) (hereinafter Lubanga Conformation Decision). See
Lubanga Judgment, para. 1000.
Lubanga Conﬁrmation Decision, para. 342. The Chamber concluded: ‘Hence, although none of the
participants has overall control over the offence because they all depend on one another for its commission,
they all share control because each of them could frustrate the commission of the crime by not carrying out
his or her task.’
Ibid., para. 347.
Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui, Decision on the Conﬁrmation of Charges, Pre-Trial Chamber, ICC-01/04-01/07, 30
September 2008, para. 525 (hereinafter Katanga and Ngudjolo Conﬁrmation Decision).
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where he is not even present at the scene of the crime.15 It can be sufﬁcient, for
example, for the actor to be a ‘mastermind’ who decides ‘whether and how the
offence will be committed’.16
The effect of the control-theory, as devised by the Lubanga Pre-Trial and Trial
Chambers, is ambivalent. The theory limits the concept of (joint) perpetration to
those participants in a criminal enterprise whose contribution is a condition without
which the criminal plan could not have come to fruition. But on the other hand, the
theory expands the scope of perpetratorship to persons who are far removed from
the scene of the crime and do not personally perform any of the acts required by the
offence deﬁnition.
2.2. Criticism of Judge Fulford
Judge Fulford, in his separate opinion in Lubanga, agrees with the expansive element
of the deﬁnition given by the majority of the Trial Chamber. But he regards that
deﬁnition as too narrow where it demands an ‘essential’, indispensable contribution. Judge Fulford proposes instead a very simple test for joint perpetration, namely
whether there exists ‘an operative link between the individual’s contribution and
the commission of the crime’.17 By applying this test, a court would be able to avoid
‘a hypothetical investigation as to how events might have unfolded without the
accused’s involvement’.18 Yet, Judge Fulford seems to equate the required ‘operative
link’ with causation, because in the following paragraph of his opinion he demands
for co-perpetration that there exist ‘a causal link between the individual’s contribution and the crime’.19 That phrase raises the question what exactly Judge Fulford
understands by a ‘causal link’. If an act (say, the furnishing of a weapon to a murderer) is ‘operative’ in the commission of the offence (because the murderer uses that
weapon), does that create a causal link between the furnishing of the weapon and
the killing? If so, how would Judge Fulford distinguish between a (joint) perpetrator
and a mere aider and abettor? Can there be different (stronger or weaker) types of
‘causal link’? Can there be a ‘causal link’ that is not essential? Does causation not necessarily imply that without the existence of the factor in question the consequence
would not have occurred? And if not, why would a marginal, easily replaceable
contribution be sufﬁcient to turn a mere helper into a co-perpetrator? How about a
man who provides not the weapon used in the offence but a bicycle which the killer
rides to the site of the crime? Would furnishing the bicycle also have an ‘operative’
or ‘causal’ link to the killing? Would the answer to that question depend on whether
the bicycle was, under the circumstances, the only means by which the killer could
arrive at the relevant site in time to kill the victim? If so, does Judge Fulford’s analysis
not also have to take into account whether the means provided was ‘essential’?20

15
16
17
18
19
20

Lubanga Judgment, para. 1004.
Lubanga Conﬁrmation Decision, para. 330; Lubanga Judgment, para. 1003.
Separate and Dissenting Opinion Judge Fulford, para. 15.
Ibid., para. 17.
Ibid., para. 16.
Probably Judge Fulford’s ‘operative link’ would, upon closer inspection, end up looking very much like the
Lubanga majority’s ‘essential contribution’.

http://journals.cambridge.org

Downloaded: 29 Oct 2013

IP address: 128.253.7.19

AS S E S S I N G T H E C O N T RO L - T H E O RY

729

There may well be convincing answers to all these questions, but Judge Fulford
unfortunately does not provide them. The test of perpetratorship which he suggests
therefore remains vague and leaves the judges very much to their intuition rather
than providing them with standards by which to make the difﬁcult distinction
between perpetration and mere accessorial liability. Judge Fulford is correct, of
course, in pointing out that many legal systems, including the Statute of the ICC,
do not provide for different sentencing levels for perpetrators and accessories. Yet,
as long as the law distinguishes between several forms of involvement in a criminal
offence – and the ICC Statute in Article 25 (3) clearly makes such a distinction21 –
those who apply the law may not use the various labels arbitrarily. A judge cannot
on Monday convict a defendant of aiding and abetting, and on Tuesday convict
another defendant of joint perpetration on the same or very similar facts, telling the
Tuesday defendant that it makes no difference, in the result, whether he is convicted
of perpetration or of aiding and abetting.22
2.3. Criticism of Judge Van den Wyngaert
Judge Van den Wyngaert, in her concurring opinion in Ngudjolo, takes issue with
both effects of the control-theory; in her opinion, that theory is at the same time
too broad and too narrow. She suggests that joint perpetration does not require
an ‘essential’ causal contribution23 but ‘a direct contribution to the realisation of
the material elements of the crime’.24 Like Judge Fulford, Judge Van den Wyngaert
rejects the ‘essentiality’ requirement because it compels judges ‘to engage in artiﬁcial,
speculative exercises about whether a crime would still have been committed if
one of the accused had not made exactly the same contribution’.25 But she also
ﬁnds insufﬁcient Judge Fulford’s broad-stroke approach under which anyone who
provides some ‘causal’ element can be treated as a perpetrator. Instead, Judge Van den
Wyngaert would limit perpetratorship to those who directly bring about the material
elements of an offence.26 She concedes that the notion of ‘direct’ perpetration is not
easy to apply to some of the more complex offences typical of international law,
such as displacing a civilian population in violation of Article 8(2)(e)(viii) of the ICC

21

22

23
24
25
26

Judge Fulford claims that the concepts which appear in the four subsections of Art. 5(3) of the ICC Statute
‘will often be indistinguishable in their application vis-à-vis a particular situation, and by creating a clear
degree of crossover between the various modes of liability, Article 25(3) covers all eventualities’. Therefore,
he thinks, ‘the possible modes of commission under Article 25(3)(a)–(d) of the Statute were not intended
to be mutually exclusive.’ (Separate and Dissenting Opinion Judge Fulford, para. 7). It is not quite clear on
what evidence Judge Fulford makes this claim. But even if the authors of the ICC Statute had foreseen that,
in a given situation, more than one mode of liability under Section 25(3) might be applicable, that would
not justify leaving these various modes undeﬁned and adjudicating cases using a vague ‘crossover’ form of
criminal liability.
The dispute over whether Art. 25(3) (a)–(d) of the ICC Statute contains a hierarchical ranking of various
forms of liability (Lubanga Judgment, paras. 994–999, See also G. Werle, ‘Individual criminal responsibility
in Article 25 ICC Statute’, (2007) 5 JICJ 953, 957, or a mere listing (Separate and Dissenting Opinion Judge
Fulford, para. 9; Concurring Opinion Judge Van den Wyngaert, paras. 22–30) is not of much relevance to the
question whether it is necessary to properly deﬁne these forms of liability.
Concurring Opinion Judge Van den Wyngaert, paras. 41–42.
Ibid., para. 44 (emphasis in the original).
Ibid., para. 42.
Ibid., para. 44.
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Statute. In these cases – which may well be the majority of cases coming before the
ICC – she would regard as ‘direct’ perpetrators even those who plan or organize the
acts in question, because planning is ‘an intrinsic part of the actual execution of the
crime’.27
One may regard this ‘softening’ of Judge Van den Wyngaert’s approach as a sign of
welcome ﬂexibility. But the adaptations proposed by Judge Van den Wyngaert also
indicate that the criterion of ‘directness’ has only a modest measure of distinctive
substance. If ‘direct’ causation can also mean participation in the planning stage
long before the actual displacement of civilians takes place (to use Judge Van den
Wyngaert’s example), what then is the difference between ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ or
‘remote’ causation? Judge Van den Wyngaert claims that what is ‘direct’ will have
to be determined by the facts of each case.28 But if it is the judges who in each
individual case need to determine what is ‘direct’ and what is not, why not simply
leave the question who is a perpetrator to the appreciation of the court, as Judge
Fulford suggests?
The ‘directness’ criterion also lacks a convincing normative basis. Judge Van den
Wyngaert’s main argument in favour of this criterion is that it treats individual and
joint perpetrators equally: since a person acting alone can be convicted only if he
‘brings about’ the material elements of the offence (e.g., by shooting the victim), she
claims, the same should apply if two or more persons act jointly.29 But joint perpetration differs in one critical aspect from perpetration by an individual offender: the
job of committing the offence is divided up among the co-actors; they join forces
for the very purpose of relieving each participant of the necessity to ‘bring about’
by himself the result of the criminal plan. If it were a necessary requirement for
every joint perpetrator to individually fulﬁl each element of the offence deﬁnition,
the concept of joint perpetration would be superﬂuous – every participant could
be convicted as an individual perpetrator. Judge Van den Wyngaert’s equation of
individual and joint perpetration thus misses the very point of joint perpetration:
the division of labour among the co-perpetrators.
2.4. What makes joint perpetration?
What, then, is the distinctive feature of joint perpetration? Before we proceed to
suggest an answer to this question let us consider why it is necessary to do so. As we
said above, whenever the law differentiates between perpetrators and accessories
there have to be criteria for drawing the line between these categories, lest the
courts apply them on a mere hunch or on arbitrary grounds. A need to deﬁne joint
perpetration and to keep it apart from other types of criminal liability therefore exists
in all legal systems that, like the ICC Statute, distinguish between perpetrators and
accessories.
As we have seen, single-word ‘theories’ (relying on expressions like ‘direct’ or
‘operative link’ to solve the problem) hardly satisfy the need to inform and shape the
27
28
29

Ibid., para. 47.
Ibid., para. 46.
Ibid., para. 45.
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application of the law in this area, because they do not offer more than a very general
idea about what may be the gist of joint perpetration. The control theory as devised by
the Lubanga Pre-Trial Chamber has the great advantage of offering a binary criterion:
either one’s contribution to the completion of the crime is essential, i.e., a conditio
sine qua non – or it is not. And the ‘essentiality’ criterion is also prima vista plausible:
it reﬂects the value judgement that those who provide central contributions are, in
general, more blameworthy than those who remain at the margins of the criminal
enterprise and provide only support that the main actors could have done without.
Yet, even the control-theory may lack sufﬁcient sophistication. One of its problems
is the question from what perspective the ‘essential’ character of a given act is to
be determined. This can be done from an ex ante and an ex post perspective; that is,
looking forward from the stage of planning the crime,30 or looking backward after
its completion (or frustration). The analysis of the ‘essentiality’ of any participant’s
contribution is easier and more reliable if one gauges it ex ante, for example at
the planning stage of the crime. Looking at the plans of the persons involved, it is
not difﬁcult to determine whose contribution they deem indispensable and which
contributions they regard as ‘accessorial’; that is, useful but not crucial to the success
of the plan. Taking an ex ante view has the disadvantage, however, that the judge must
accept as binding any miscalculation on the part of the conspirators: if A and B think
that a robbery can succeed only if B provides a gun, that expectation would, under
an ex ante ‘essentiality’ test, turn B into a joint perpetrator if he actually furnishes
the gun; and that would hold true even if A does not use the gun in the robbery
but obtains the money by mere verbal threats. Using an ex post perspective (‘Was B’s
contribution “essential” to the robbery as it was actually carried out?’) avoids this
difﬁculty but leads to the problem of hypothetical guessing, which Judges Fulford
and Van den Wyngaert raised in their opinions. If A, in the robbery hypothetical,
actually uses B’s gun in order to threaten the victim, we cannot say with any degree
of certainty what the outcome would have been if B had not provided the gun.
Perhaps A would have desisted from the robbery altogether, or perhaps he might
have hidden a banana or some other object in his pocket and pretended that it was a
gun, thus threatening the victim sufﬁciently to make him hand over the money. In
conclusion, then, while both perspectives may lead to different results in any given
case, neither is without ﬂaws.
But that is not even the main problem with the ‘essentiality’ test. Contrary to
what Judge Fulford has written,31 the Lubanga court’s control-theory may not deﬁne
perpetratorship too narrowly but too broadly. The way the Trial Chamber applies

30

31

The Trial Chamber in Lubanga seems to take an ex ante perspective where it refers to the assignment of roles
as the test for what is ‘essential’ (Lubanga Judgment, para. 1000); but it is not entirely clear whether the
Chamber would rule out a reassessment of the distribution of roles after the fact. The prosecution in Lubanga
proposed to distinguish between an assessment ex ante (where the co-perpetrator must have been assigned a
contribution that was ‘central to the implementation’ of the common plan) and a retrospective assessment
of the plan as it was carried out (where it should be sufﬁcient that the co-perpetrator’s contribution can be
deemed ‘substantial’); cf. Lubanga Judgment, paras. 990–991. The Trial Chamber did not adopt or even discuss
that distinction, thus leaving unresolved the question whether the requirements of joint perpetration should
be assessed from the participants’ perspective ex ante or from an objective perspective ex post.
Separate and Dissenting Opinion Judge Fulford, para 16.
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the test to the facts of Lubanga gives an indication of how far the net of perpetration is
cast under the seemingly narrow ‘essentiality’ test. A joint perpetrator, the Lubanga
majority holds, does not have to be present at the scene of the crime, and there need
not even exist a direct or physical link between his contribution and the commission
of the crime; it is sufﬁcient for a perpetrator to assist in formulating the relevant
strategy or plan, to become involved in directing or controlling other participants’
or to determine the roles of those involved in the offence.32 If all these contributions,
which can be quite remote in time and place from the commission of the offence,
are deemed ‘essential’ and thus sufﬁcient to establish perpetratorship, then one
must ask what remains for mere accessorial liability as an instigator or an aider
and abettor. If, for example, a scientist in 2012 provides critical information which
enables the leadership of a state to produce chemical weapons prohibited under
Article 8(2)(b)(xviii) ICC Statute, is he then – assuming he has foreseen the use of the
weapons – a joint perpetrator of an attack carried out with these weapons in 2014?
If we wish to distinguish between those who are at the centre of the criminal
offence and therefore deserve to be labelled as perpetrators, and those who remain
at the margins in a supporting role and should therefore be punished as accessories,
then the one-dimensional criterion of the indispensability of the contribution may
be insufﬁcient because it captures only one aspect that may be relevant. We might
indeed have to give up the (attractive) idea of basing the distinction on a single factor
and look instead for a cluster of factors that will have to be taken into consideration.
In doing so, we should be aware that the line between (joint) perpetrators and
accessories cannot be drawn on empirical grounds but requires a normative (value)
judgement – a judgement that in the last resort is based on a notion of fair attribution
and is therefore soft at the edges. The factors relevant for this value judgment cannot
simply be deduced from the facts of each individual case, because facts by themselves
give us no clue as to their normative valuation. What we can do, however, is try
to identify factors which indicate a ‘central’ role in a criminal enterprise, and thus
perpetratorship. Even when we have agreed on such factors, there is still plenty of
room for judicial weighing and balancing in each case, because these factors may,
on a given set of facts, pull in opposite directions. But at least we would have criteria
by which to rationally evaluate any borderline case.
One approach in deﬁning such criteria centres on mens rea. It has often been
emphasized that participation in or at least adherence to a common plan is one
factor that must exist in any case of joint perpetration. A person who does not cooperate with others on the basis of some – albeit silent – agreement may be liable
as an individual perpetrator but cannot be a ‘joint’ perpetrator. What other mens
rea requirements may be necessary for perpetratorship depends on each offence
deﬁnition.33 One should note, however, that a common plan, as that term is traditionally understood by international courts, often exists also between perpetrators
and accessories: an instigator consciously works together with the perpetrator in
32
33

Lubanga Judgment, paras. 1003–1004.
It is not logically impossible for several persons to co-perpetrate a crime of recklessness or dolus eventualis;
but inadvertent negligence and joint perpetration in a technical sense seem to be mutually exclusive.

http://journals.cambridge.org

Downloaded: 29 Oct 2013

IP address: 128.253.7.19

AS S E S S I N G T H E C O N T RO L - T H E O RY

733

the initial stage, and aiders and abettors also often support the commission of the
offence based on an agreement with the main perpetrators. The existence of such a
minimal agreement therefore is a necessary but not a sufﬁcient condition of joint
perpetration. One of the authors of this article has recently developed the idea that
a joint intention that the group commit a collective crime is the deﬁning element
of co-perpetration; what is required, under this approach, is joint deliberation and
the meshing of sub-plans among co-perpetrators.34 Another subjective factor of possible relevance is a strong personal interest in the success of the criminal enterprise,
going beyond the minimal requirement of mens rea. Such a personal interest may
be regarded as a (weak) indicator of joint perpetration, because a person interested
in the outcome will, ceteris paribus, contribute more eagerly and persistently than a
person who acts out of altruism or for a set fee.35
An alternative approach places greater emphasis on objective factors. If one follows
that approach, the indispensable nature of a person’s contribution weighs heavily as
an indicator of perpetratorship, and might even be regarded as a necessary requirement for a ﬁnding of perpetratorship. A person whose contribution has no critical
bearing on the implementation of the criminal plan hardly qualiﬁes as a ‘central’ or
‘essential’ participant. But as we have tried to show above, the indispensability of
a contribution is not under all circumstances a sufﬁcient condition for attributing
perpetratorship. One option is to add an element of immediacy, of carrying out a
task temporally close to the commission of the material elements of the offence.
Roxin, whose writings have to some extent inﬂuenced the international debate on
this subject,36 has suggested that only those who participate in the crime after the
stage of attempt has been reached should be considered co-perpetrators.37 This limitation goes in the right direction but may be a bit too ‘technical’ since it would make
joint perpetration depend on the vagaries of the deﬁnition of attempt. But under
an objective approach, an element of ‘control’ over the actual commission of the
offence is an important indicator of joint perpetration. Typically, a joint perpetrator
(co-)decides whether and how the offence is actually perpetrated, either by directly

34
35

36

37

See J. D. Ohlin, ‘Joint Intentions to Commit International Crimes’, (2011) 11 Chicago JIL 693, at 721.
German courts have traditionally relied heavily on subjective factors for distinguishing between perpetrators
and accessories, treating as mere accessories those who participated in the crime with an animus socii
(mind of an associate); see Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Court of Justice), Judgment of 23 January 1958, 11
Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Strafsachen 268, at 271–2; Bundesgerichtshof, Judgment of 10 March
1961, 16 Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Strafsachen 12, at 14; for a summary of the present position
of the Federal Court of Justice see Bundesgerichtshof, Judgment of 24 October 2002, 48 Entscheidungen des
Bundesgerichtshofes in Strafsachen 52, at 56. Of course, in most cases it is the judges who determine, in hindsight
and on considerations of equity, what may have been the ‘mind’ of a participant at the time of the crime.
The emphasis on subjective elements thus leaves the distinction between perpetrators and accessories to the
practically unreviewable discretion of the trial court.
It is not necessary here to discuss at length Professor Roxin’s many contributions to the German debate
on perpetratorship. But it should be noted that Roxin has expressly rejected the ‘essentiality’ theory as
deﬁned by the Lubanga majority: Roxin – followed by the great majority of German writers – requires for
co-perpetratorship a ‘substantial’ contribution to the common plan as regarded ex ante, but writes that
the contribution of a co-perpetrator need not be ‘causal’ for the offence as a whole (See Roxin, Strafrecht
Allgemeiner Teil supra note 6, at Section 25, marginal note 213). For an overview of the current German
debate on the subject, see B. Weißer, Täterschaft in Europa (2011), 333–7.
See Roxin, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil supra note 6, at Section 25, marginal note 199.
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taking part in the actus reus or at least by overseeing – by telephone, for example –
the commission of the crime by the immediate actors.38
In sum, the concept of ‘control’ in the control-theory as propounded by the
Lubanga majority may be too one-dimensional. What we should be looking for is a
more comprehensive model of joint perpetratorship which contains both subjective
and objective elements. Typical factors are a person’s involvement in the planning
of a joint enterprise, his mens rea, and possibly his personal interest in the success
of the enterprise; furthermore, the importance of his contribution to the success of
the criminal plan and the proximity of his contribution to the actual commission
of the offence. It is a matter of debate whether greater emphasis should be placed on
subjective or on objective factors. But only if we recognize that there is a cluster of
different considerations that may be relevant can we rationally lead that debate.

3. I NDIRECT CO - PERPETRATION
Judge Van den Wyngaert, in her concurring opinion in the Ngudjolo acquittal, analyses the mode of liability known as indirect co-perpetration and concludes that the
theory is not included in Article 25(a) of the ICC Statute.39
The issue is of the highest importance, since many of the recent indictments
at the ICC, including al-Bashir and the Kenya cases, have accused the defendants
of perpetrating their crimes as indirect co-perpetrators.40 Indeed, one can easily
understand why the doctrine is so powerful. Since the ICC concentrates on the
highest-level perpetrators far removed from the scene of the crime (and the actus
reus), the Ofﬁce of the Prosecutor must assert a linking principle that connects the
defendants to the physical commission of the crime by street-level perpetrators.
The building blocks of the doctrine stem from combining other modes of
liability already introduced into the ICC jurisprudence through German criminallaw theory. In Lubanga, an ICC Pre-Trial Chamber deﬁned co-perpetrators as
perpetrators exercising joint control over the crime.41 In addition, Roxin had developed the notion that a person can be guilty of indirect perpetration where
he controls the direct perpetrators – who may themselves be criminally responsible – by means of a hierarchically organized structure. He labelled this as
38

39
40

41

Under that test, a gang leader might be a joint perpetrator of a bank robbery where he is in contact, by
mobile phone, with the actors in the bank, and can decide, for example, that the robbery attempt should be
abandoned when the perpetrators report unexpected obstacles. If that is not the case, the leader of a criminal
group would come under the label of ‘ordering, soliciting or inducing’ (Art. 25 (3)(b) ICC Statute), or he might
be considered a perpetrator ‘through another person’ if the special requirements of domination of others are
fulﬁlled. For extensive argument on these points, see Roxin, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil supra note 6, at Section
25, marginal notes 198 et seq.; B. Schünemann, Section 25, marginal notes 180 et seq., in H. W. Laufhütte, R.
Rissing-van Saan, and K. Tiedemann (eds.), Strafgesetzbuch: Leipziger Kommentar, Vol. 1 (2007).
Concurring Opinion Judge Van den Wyngaert, para. 59.
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura and Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, Decision on Conﬁrmation of
Charges, Pre-Trial Chamber II, ICC-01/09-02/11, 23 January 2012 (hereinafter Muthaura et al. Conﬁrmation
Decision); Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang, Decision on Conﬁrmation of Charges,
ICC Appeals Chamber, Case No. ICC-01/09-01/11 (hereinafter Ruto et al. Conﬁrmation Decision); Prosecutor v.
Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Decision on Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar
Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Pre-Trial Chamber I, ICC-02/05-01/09, 4 March 2009.
Lubanga Conﬁrmation Decision, para. 340.
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Organisationsherrschaft, or perpetration through an organized apparatus of power.42
By combining these two modes of liability, the Ofﬁce of the Prosecutor and the ICC
developed the doctrine of indirect co-perpetration – what can only be described as
a truly potent prosecutorial tool; it allows the conviction of defendants who are
substantially removed from the physical perpetrator of the crime along two axes.43
One can imagine the wide applicability of this theory; it is certainly not limited
to the Katanga and Ngudjolo case. Indeed, it may very well represent the future of
international criminal prosecutions before the ICC, just as joint criminal enterprise
(JCE) came to deﬁne the prosecutorial strategy regarding perpetration at the ICTY.
In most cases involving governmental or similarly organized atrocities, multiple
higher-level government or rebel ofﬁcials will collaborate to perpetrate the criminal conduct. Moreover, none of these ofﬁcials will commit the crimes directly by
themselves; rather, one or more of them will utilize vertical bureaucracies under
their authority. The result is a deadly efﬁcient division of labour. Or so proponents
of the doctrine would argue, thereby equating the culpability of all leaders at the horizontal level as full perpetrators. Indeed, this was the original theory in the Katanga
and Ngudjolo case. Both Katanga and Ngudjolo allegedly utilized rebel organizations
at their disposal and only by combining their forces could they perpetrate the atrocities. Therefore, according to the OTP, each defendant was not only responsible
for the actions of their own troops but also responsible for the actions of the other’s
troops.44 This cross-liability represented the full force of the indirect co-perpetration
doctrine. Leaders become responsible not just for individuals under their command,
but also for individuals that their collaborators command.
3.1. Can modes of liability be combined at will?
In our view, Van den Wyngaert was right to express caution about this mode of liability. First and most importantly, Van den Wyngaert argued that there was nothing
in the text of Article 25 to justify such ad-hockery.45 Article 25(3)(a) talks of perpetrating ‘jointly with another’ and ‘through another person’, but does not mention
the possibility of combining these modes of liability.46 Can separate modes of liability be combined without special justiﬁcation?47 There are normative reasons to
be sceptical of such combinations and it must be determined whether they are consistent with international criminal law in general and the ICC Statute in particular.
42
43

44
45
46
47

See Roxin, ‘Crimes as Part of Organized Power Structures’, supra note 6, 193–207.
Not only are such defendants vertically removed from the commission of the crime (by virtue of their
indirect perpetration), but they are horizontally removed as well (by virtue of their co-perpetration with
other collaborators on the horizontal level). The notion of ‘control’ then provides the connection that links
such defendants, along the two axes, to the physical perpetrators of the atrocities. See J. D. Ohlin, ‘SecondOrder Linking Principles: Combining Vertical and Horizontal Modes of Liability’, (2012) 25 LJIL 771. Indirect
co-perpetration therefore has some structural similarities with later versions of JCE theory, because under the
latter doctrine the leadership-level JCE need not encompass the relevant physical perpetrators, who might
report directly to one member of the JCE.
Katanga and Ngudjolo Conﬁrmation Decision, para. 484.
See Concurring Opinion Judge Van den Wyngaert, para. 60.
Ibid., para. 61.
See Concurring Opinion Judge Van den Wyngaert, para. 62 (concluding that modes of liability can be
combined when the elements of each are established). For a comparative-law perspective on combining
modes of liability: Van Sliedregt, supra note 10, at 68–9.
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In the case of indirect co-perpetration, one might argue that the defendants in such
cases will independently satisfy the criteria for each mode of liability. Consequently,
the demands of both co-perpetration and indirect perpetration are independently
satisﬁed. So what could be the harm in that?
Indirect co-perpetration involves something more than a straightforward application of the concepts of indirect and co-perpetration as those terms are used in Article
25 of the ICC Statute. The Katanga and Ngudjolo Pre-Trial Chamber decision on the
Conﬁrmation of Charges concluded that only with the co-operation of both forces
were the defendants able to consummate the international crimes.48 But it was not
the case that each of the defendants met the standards for both co-operation and
indirect perpetration. Indeed, if that had been the case, the doctrine of indirect coperpetration would have been superﬂuous; prosecutors could simply have selected
between co-perpetration and indirect perpetration and could have proceeded with
one of these doctrines as their theory of the case. For example, in the ICTY Stakić
case, one of the ﬁrst to attempt application of the control-theory, the Trial Chamber,
held that Stakić was responsible as a principal to the crime even though it was subordinates of his co-perpetrator who performed the actual killings.49 It was therefore
not the case that Stakić independently met the standards for indirect perpetration,
since he was not personally in control of the vertical organization that performed
the killings. The question is whether such doctrinal overreach is a natural outgrowth
of the judicial application of the doctrine of indirect co-perpetration or whether it
is implicit in the doctrine itself.
None of this suggests that an adequate theory of indirect co-perpetration cannot be
constructed. However, it cannot be merely assumed, and that theory is certainly not a
straightforward application of the bare text of the Statute. Constructing this theory
requires a judicial recognition of how the control-theory has evolved in German
criminal law doctrine and how far it should be extended, based on an independent
examination of basic principles of criminal law Dogmatik. Some theory must explain
this new mode of liability as it emerges from the raw materials of Article 25(3)(a).
Through forming a common intent, both Katanga and Ngudjolo allegedly reached
beyond their own troops. They built a team of two, a collective with power over
both of their troops. This fact may justify a legal attribution of the acts of Lubanga’s
troops to Ngudjolo, and vice versa.50 However, an adequate theory needs to carefully
distinguish between individuals who control distinct organizations but deploy them
towards a common cause and individuals who jointly exercise combined authority
over a single vertical organization. The latter constitutes a junta model of indirect
co-perpetration via a single apparatus of power, while the former represents a joint

48
49
50

Katanga and Chui Conﬁrmation Decision, para. 493.
Prosecutor v. Stakić, Trial Judgement, IT-97-24, T.Ch., 31 July 2003, para. 469.
On this point, see the analysis by B. Burghardt and G. Werle, ‘Die mittelbare Mittaterschaft–Fortentwicklung
deutscher Strafrechtsdogmatik im Völkerstrafrecht?’, in R. Bloy (ed.), Gerechte Strafe und legitimes Strafrecht:
Festschrift für Manfred Maiwald zum 75. Geburtstag (2010), 849; Weigend, supra note 10, at 110–11; S. Wirth,
‘Co-Perpetration in the Lubanga Trial Judgment, (2012) 10 JICJ 971, at 980 et seq.
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perpetration through multiple vertical organizations.51 The judicial standards for
each ﬂavour of the doctrine might be different, given the different structure of
the ‘control’ in these cases. So far the ICC has not explored these differences to a
satisfactory degree.
3.2. The role for organizations under Article 25
Van den Wyngaert also expressed anxiety about the growing importance of organizations within the control-theory. Simply put, she argued that Article 25 applies
to indirect control over persons committing international crimes, but not indirect
control over organizations committing the crimes.52 This is a complex point and one
that the various Pre-Trial Chambers have shown insufﬁcient dedication to addressing. Of course, all organizations, whether criminal or corporate, are composed of
natural persons.53 Hence Article 25 is applied to the indirect control of persons even
where control is exercised by means of an organization. The question is whether
it is appropriate for the doctrine to give a special position to ‘organizations’ as a
legally signiﬁcant mediator that stands between the defendant and the relevant
physical perpetrators who commit the actual crimes.54 For Van den Wyngaert, apparently, the concept of the organization is a distraction that ﬁnds no support in
the Statute; furthermore it necessarily involves situations where individual control
over the street-level perpetrators is increasingly attenuated (through bureaucracy)
rather than direct. This objection is debatable. Roxin’s theory in fact emphasized
that bureaucratic control is, in its own way, ‘immediate’ because the organization
carries out the orders of the leader as a matter of course.
If the ICC Appeals Chamber wishes to continue using Organisationsherrschaft
within the context of indirect co-perpetration, it ought to come up with a deeper
theoretical argument that explains why indirect perpetration through an organization is consistent with the language of Article 25 and its reference to persons.
One argument might be that the organization is nothing more than a convenient legal shorthand for the control exercised by the defendant over the streetlevel perpetrators who performed the actus reus of the crime. Under this approach,
Organisationsherrschaft would not be a separate mode of liability at all, and therefore its absence from the text of Article 25 would be irrelevant. Rather, it would be
classiﬁed as one avenue towards reaching the Article 25 standard of indirect perpetration: under that view, the indirect perpetrator indeed commits the offence through

51

52
53
54

See Burghardt and Werle, supra note 50, at 863–4 (distinguishing between ‘indirect co-perpetration’ per se
and cases of ‘joint indirect perpetration’); Weigend, supra note 10, at 111 (junta model involves ‘one group of
subordinates subject to control by a group of leaders working together’); Ohlin, supra note 43, at 779.
See Concurring Opinion Judge Van den Wyngaert, para. 52 (‘elevating the concept of “control over an
organization” to a constitutive element of criminal responsibility under Article 25(3)(a) is misguided’).
Ibid., para. 53.
Ibid. (‘there is a fundamental difference between the interaction among individuals, even within the context
of an organisation, and the exercise of authority over an abstract entity such as an “organisation”. Moreover,
by dehumanising the relationship between the indirect perpetrator and the physical perpetrator, the control
over an organisation concept dilutes the level of personal inﬂuence that the indirect perpetrator must
exercise over the person through whom he or she commits a crime’).
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another person, namely the immediate actor. The organization provides the
‘through’ element; it connects the indirect perpetrator with the actor.
Another trend that might support the role of organizations within Article 25 is
the growing importance of organizations in other areas of the substantive doctrine
of international criminal justice. For example, the requirement of an ‘organizational
plan or policy’ in crimes against humanity is now an accepted element along with
the requirement of a widespread or systematic attack.55 Although this element is
controversial, and some would prefer to eliminate it, the recent cases at the ICC are
built around it.56 For example, the indictments against the Kenyan suspects relied
on the existence of two organizations – the Mungiki and what the ICC dubbed
the ‘Network’ – to fulﬁl both the organizational requirement for crimes against
humanity and also the organizational requirement for an organized apparatus of
power.57 A coherent judicial theory of ‘organizations’ within international criminal
law would have to holistically address all of these issues with one theory of macrocriminality.
3.3. Dolus eventualis
The ﬁnal – and perhaps most important – objection to the ICC’s continued reliance
on indirect co-perpetration involves the application of dolus eventualis to these cases.
The term dolus eventualis is notorious for competing and often conﬂicting deﬁnitions;
the term may very well obscure more than it illuminates. Scholars at the domestic
and international levels have argued extensively over whether it includes a socalled ‘volitional’ component, i.e. an attitude by the defendant (either resignation,
reconciliation, approval, or consent) regarding the future event. There is also a
parallel debate about whether dolus eventualis is similar to – or greater than – its
common-law cousin, recklessness. However, all deﬁnitions agree that dolus eventualis
involves liability for foreseeing the mere possibility of future events.
One way of extending criminal liability to cases where the actor does not directly
foresee the harmful result has been devised by the ICTY. Under the third variant of
JCE (JCE III), a participant in a JCE is held responsible for any reasonably foreseeable
act of any other participant done in furtherance of the joint enterprise. JCE III thus
allows convictions – as a principal, no less – for crimes committed by co-venturers
that fall outside the scope of the agreed-upon plan. The ICC has so far been reluctant
to adopt JCE doctrine. By refusing to read JCE doctrine into Article 25(3)(d) of the
ICC Statute, the ICC developed a reputation for analytical rigour with regard to
criminal-law theory. Yet, at least part of the rationale for the ICC’s adoption of
control-theory, though never explicitly stated as such,58 may have been to reach

55
56
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For different views on this requirement, see the symposium in (2010) 23 LJIL 825.
But see M. Cupido, ‘The Policy Underlying Crimes against Humanity: Practical Reﬂections on a Theoretical
Debate’, (2011) 22 Criminal Law Forum, 275 (suggesting that the facts as applied in various cases show a
greater similarity between the ICTY and ICC standards for crimes against humanity with regard to the plan
or policy requirement).
See Muthaura et al. Conﬁrmation Decision, para. 229; Ruto et al. Conﬁrmation Decision, para. 186.
The Trial Chamber in Stakić was more explicit about searching a new path away from JCE.
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similar results as would have been possible under JCE without explicitly adopting
that much-maligned doctrine.
Indirect co-perpetration, as applied by the ICC, may indeed not be that much different from JCE III and its Pinkerton-like vicarious liability.59 A structural similarity
appears as soon as liability for dolus eventualis is imposed. To be sure, there is conﬂicting precedent in this area, and some ICC Chambers have concluded that dolus
eventualis is not applicable to most crimes prosecuted before the court.60 But some
Chambers have declared that dolus eventualis (or some version of it) is consistent
with Article 30; and when combined with indirect co-perpetration, the two produce
a result that is very similar to the controversial JCE III.61 Speciﬁcally, indirect coperpetration allows the defendant to be convicted for the crimes committed by the
virtual apparatus of power deployed by one of the defendant’s co-perpetrators. If
dolus eventualis is added to the mix, a conviction is allowed even if the crimes committed by the organized apparatus of power were not part of the criminal endeavour
agreed to by the horizontal co-perpetrators. The only limiting principle, according
to the Pre-Trial Chamber in Lubanga, is that the defendant must have been aware
of the possibility that such crimes might be committed and must have reconciled
himself to that possibility or consented to it.62 Indeed, the Pre-Trial Chamber recognized that ‘if the risk of bringing about the objective elements of the crime is low,
the suspect must have clearly or expressly accepted the idea that such objective elements may result from his or her actions or omissions’.63 The result is substantially
similar to JCE III because both the defendant and his co-perpetrator are prosecuted
as principals even though their attitudes to the crime are quite different. The defendant did not desire the crimes but nonetheless realized that they might occur;
his co-perpetrator, however, might have indirectly perpetrated the crimes with fullblown intent. Whatever the merits of this theory, one should not pretend that it
departs signiﬁcantly from the underlying premise of JCE III.64 Both involve liability
for risk-taking behaviour.65
None of this is to suggest that dolus eventualis is not a legitimate mental state,
used in many jurisdictions, to ground criminal culpability. It certainly is. Rather,
the doctrinal question is whether it is consistent with the default mens rea standard
expressed in Article 30 of the Statute, which states that the applicable mental state
shall be intent and knowledge ‘unless otherwise provided’. Intent and knowledge
59

60

61
62

63
64
65

Pinkerton liability allows vicarious liability for the acts of co-conspirators that fall outside the scope of the
criminal plan. It was cited with approval in Prosecutor v. Tadić, Judgment, Appeals Chamber, IT-94-A, 15 July
1999, para. 224 n. 289 (hereinafter Tadić Appeals Judgement), citing Pinkerton, 328 U.S. 640 (1946).
See Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the ICC Statute on
the Charges of the Prosecutor against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ICC-01/05-01/08, Pre-Trial Chamber II, 15
June 2009, paras. 366–369 (rejecting application of dolus eventualis under the ICC Statute).
For example, see the analysis in Lubanga Conﬁrmation Decision’ paras. 352–353 (applying dolus eventualis).
Ibid., para 352. There are, of course, different formulations of dolus eventualis in domestic legal systems; the
notion of ‘reconciling’ oneself to the potential consequence is just one of them, though it is arguably the
most inﬂuential. For a discussion of the different versions, see M. E. Badar, ‘Dolus Eventualis and the Rome
Statute without It?’, (2009) 12 New Crim. L Rev. (2009) 433.
Lubanga Conﬁrmation Decision, para. 354 (emphasis added).
See, e.g., Ohlin, supra note 43, 771 et seq.
In Tadić, the ICTY Appeals Chamber explicitly referred to dolus eventualis as the basis for JCE III, where the
defendant ‘willingly took the risk’. See Tadić Appeals Judgement, para. 220.
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require awareness that the consequence will occur ‘in the ordinary course of events’.
Most of the authoritative commentators writing about the ICC Statute drafting
process agree that dolus eventualis was not explicitly covered by the Article 30 standard. For example, Roger Clark famously wrote that ‘dolus eventualis and its common
law cousin, recklessness, suffered banishment by consensus’ at Rome.66 The key
piece of evidence is the draft of the 1996 Preparatory Committee report, which included a subsection on dolus eventualis and recklessness that was subsequently deleted
and never made it into the ﬁnal version of the ICC Statute.67
To reiterate the point, none of this demands a form of global scepticism regarding
dolus eventualis. Rather, the point is simply that its application to situations of indirect
co-perpetration is powerful, and the ICC must tread carefully to determine whether
it is consistent with the principle of individual culpability. A defendant charged
with being an indirect co-perpetrator is held responsible for actions perpetrated by
a vertical organization that he does not personally direct. In cases of dolus eventualis,
the crimes are not desired by the defendant but merely foreseen as a potential risk.
What is this hypothetical defendant’s level of culpability? Surely such individuals
are guilty of some offence under some mode of liability, but that is not the question
here – the issue is whether they are deserving of Roxin’s label of Täter hinter dem
Täter, the mastermind who stands behind the criminal operation. Given that indirect
co-perpetration is not explicitly listed in Article 25, the ICC ought to be certain that
such a classiﬁcation is warranted. As it stands now, none of the previous opinions of
the court have yet accomplished this task.

4. H IERARCHY OF BLAMEWORTHINESS ?
4.1. Normative approaches to criminal participation
According to the proponents of control-theory, Article 25(3)(a) is an expression of
what can be called a normative approach to criminal participation: the principal is
the one who is ‘most responsible’ in the sense that he or she has decisive inﬂuence
on the commission of the crime, without necessarily physically committing it. This
contrasts to what can be termed the naturalistic or empirical approach to liability,
which takes as a starting point the natural world and the reality of cause and
effect.68 In ‘empirical terms’, the perpetrator is the one who performs the material
elements of the offence and thus ‘perpetrates’ or ‘commits’ the crime. The accessory
or accomplice is the one who contributes to causing the actus reus. Anglo-American
66

67
68

See R. Clark, ‘Elements of Crimes in Early Decisions of Pre-Trial Chambers of the International Criminal
Court’, (2009) New Zealand YIL. Piragoff and Robinson conclude that while dolus eventualis can be deﬁned in
many ways, if it refers to ‘substantial or serious risk that a consequence will occur and indifference whether
it does’ then it was ‘not incorporated explicitly into article 30’ and the only way to bring it into play is with
the ‘unless otherwise provided’ prong of Article 30. D. K. Piragoff and D. Robinson, ‘Mental Element’, in O.
Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (2008), at 849, 860 n. 67.
Schabas’s analysis is similar. See W. A. Schabas, The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome
Statute (2010), at 476 (concluding that dolus eventualis was rejected during Rome Statute negotiations).
Chairman’s Text, UN Doc. A/AC.249/1997/WG.2/CRP.4.
On normative and naturalistic approaches to criminal participation in international law, see J. Vogel, ‘How
to Determine Individual Criminal Responsibility in Systematic Contexts: Twelve Models’ (2002) Cahiers de
défense sociale, 151–69.
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complicity law, based on a physical concept of ‘commission’, is the classic example
of the empirical approach to criminal participation.
The empirical system can be referred to as a bottom-up system. If it is applied to a
complex structure of criminal co-operation, say an army, one starts with the soldier
who killed a civilian, and then moves on to his superior who gave the orders, and
then further on to the government minister who devised the relevant policy. The
normative approach, on the other hand, represents a top-down system. One starts
with the person who has the main responsibility, for example the minister, and
then works one’s way down to the smaller fry in the lower echelons of the military
unit. Thus, in the Anglo-American complicity scheme the government minister is
an accessory, while on the basis of a normative system like the control-theory he is
a principal.
The ICTY has adopted a normative approach with regard to JCE liability. The Appeals Chamber in Tadić referred to JCE, or common purpose as it was then termed,
as ‘a form of accomplice liability’.69 But it also used the term ‘perpetrator’ and ‘coperpetrator’ to refer to a ‘participant’ in a JCE.70 Moreover, it brought JCE liability under the heading of ‘committing’ and distinguished it from aiding and abetting, which,
it felt, understates the degree of criminal responsibility.71 These ﬁndings sparked
a debate amongst Trial Chambers in subsequent cases. There were judges who
felt it important to adhere to the principal/committing–accomplice/participation
distinction,72 and there were others who thought that the principal–accomplice
classiﬁcation is immaterial because it is at sentencing level that variance in roles is
expressed.
Without going into details of the debate,73 it sufﬁces to conclude that with JCE a
categorization of offenders along normative lines was introduced to ICTY case law. In
the Odjanić Decision, the majority of the Appeals Chamber – over a strong dissent by
Judge Hunt – afﬁrmed that ‘joint criminal enterprise is to be regarded, not as a form of
accomplice liability, but as a form of commission’.74 With the latter position, aiding
and abetting developed into a mode of liability that is considered less blameworthy
than participation in a JCE. This was conﬁrmed in Šljivančanin, where the Appeals
Chamber held that ‘aiding and abetting is a lower form of liability than ordering,
committing, or participating in a joint criminal enterprise and may as such attract a
lesser sentence’.75 Research into international sentencing conﬁrms that aiding and
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Tadić Appeals Judgement, para. 220.
Ibid., para. 192.
Ibid.
The Krstić and Kvočka Trial Chambers, on the other hand, readily accepted the distinction between coperpetrators and aiders and abettors. Prosecutor v. Krstić, Judgement, Trial Chamber I, IT-98-33-T, 2 August
2001, paras. 643–645; Prosecutor v. Kvočka, Judgement, Trial Chamber I, IT-98-30/1-T, 2 November 2001, paras.
278 and 284.
See further H. Olasolo, Criminal Responsibility of Senior Political and Military Superiors as Principals to International
Crimes (2009), 23–7; C. Damgaard, Individual Criminal Responsibility for Core International Crimes (2008), 198–
212; E. van Sliedregt, ‘Joint Criminal Enterprise as a Pathway to Convicting Individuals for Genocide’ (2007)
5 JICJ 184.
Prosecutor v. Milutinović et al., Decision on Dragoljub Ojdanić Motion Challenging Jurisdiction – Joint Criminal
Enterprise, Pre-Trial Chamber, IT-05-87-PT, 22 March 2006, para. 20.
Prosecutor v. Šljivančanin, Judgement, Appeals Chamber, IT-95-13/1-A, 5 May 2009, para. 407.
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abetting has been treated, by the ad hoc tribunals, as less blameworthy than other
modes of liability.76 By now it is safe to assume that a mitigation principle applies
at the ICTY with regard to aiding/abetting versus JCE liability, which shows the
inﬂuence of a normative approach to criminal participation.77
The same hierarchy of blameworthiness with regard to aiding/abetting vis-à-vis
JCE can be found in SCSL law. The conviction of Charles Taylor is interesting in that
respect. Taylor was convicted for aiding and abetting war crimes and crimes against
humanity and sentenced to 50 years in prison.78 Had he been convicted for JCE, the
sentence would have been higher.79 Still, 50 years is a serious sentence in the overall
SCSL sentencing practice. While aiding and abetting is considered a lesser form of
liability, it does not automatically imply a lenient sentence; leniency is a relative
concept.80
Preference for the normative model is even stronger at the ICC. The majority
of the Court strictly adheres to the distinction – introduced by the control-theory
– between principals and accessories and distinguishes between principal liability
(‘committing’) in subparagraph 3(a) and accessorial liability (‘contributing to’) in
subparagraphs (3)(b–d) using a normative approach.81 Charging defendants as intellectual or remote principals under 25(3)(a) means that they played a central role,
that they had ‘control of the crime’.82 This is contrasted to liability under subparagraphs 25(3)(b–d) where control plays no role and accessories are regarded as less
responsible and less blameworthy.
But also at the ICC the normative approach of the control-theory has been subject
to dispute. Judge Tarfusser, in his dissent to the Appeals Decision in the Regulation
55 case in Katanga, referred to the Court’s case law on Article 25(3) as ‘far from
. . . uncontentious or settled’;83 and Judges Fulford and Van den Wyngaert in their
concurring opinions manifestly disagreed with the normative hierarchy that the
control-theory (allegedly) creates in Article 25(3) of the ICC Statute.
From the viewpoint of comparative law, it is interesting to note that the majority
opinions in Lubanga (PTC and TC), on the one hand, and the concurring opinions
of Judges Fulford and Van den Wyngaert, on the other hand, reﬂect a clash of legal
cultures that, interestingly, cuts across the civil-common-law divide. The majority
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As empirical research has shown. B. Hola et al., ‘International Sentencing Facts and Figures: Sentencing
Practice at the ICTY and ICTR’ (2011) 9 JICJ411, at 417.
See also Olasolo, supra note 73, at 27.
Prosecutor v. Charles Taylor, Judgment, Trial Chamber, SCSL-03–1-T, 26 April 2012, para. 6959.
Consider the statement of Judge Lussick, a member of the Taylor bench, who held that the 80-year imprisonment requested by the prosecutor would have been excessive as Taylor was convicted of aiding and abetting,
which ‘as a mode of liability generally warrants a lesser sentence than that imposed for more direct forms of
participation’.
Rather, it affects, along with other factors, the sentence of the convicted person. Charles Taylor’s capacity
as a former head of state was an aggravating factor that seems to have ‘compensated’ the mitigation that
aiding/abetting implies.
Lubanga Conﬁrmation Decision, paras. 330–335; Katanga and Ngudjolo Decision, paras. 506–508.
Katanga and Ngudjolo Conﬁrmation Decision, para. 518.
Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Judgment on the appeal of Mr Germain Katanga
against the decision of Trial Chamber II of 21 November 2012 entitled ‘Decision on the implementation of
regulation 55 of the Regulations of the Court and severing the charges against the accused persons’, Appeals
Chamber, ICC-01/04-01/07 OA 13, 27 March 2013, para. 15.
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views stand for a ‘dogmatic’ concept of perpetratorship and accessorial liability,
which expects the substantive law to reﬂect (or describe) subtle differences in the
measure of responsibility and seeks to establish criteria that permit distinctions
between forms of liability (and, consequently, degrees of blameworthiness). This
approach is typical for the German/Hispanic tradition. The minority approach,
by contrast, looks at the substantive criminal law more from the perspective of
the legality principle: it is enough that the deﬁnitions of the general and special
parts capture as comprehensively as possible all potential forms of reprehensible
conduct. Differentiating between degrees of responsibility is not the purpose of
offense descriptions or of rules of the general part, but is left for judicial sentencing.
This reﬂects the French and the Anglo-American traditions.
Leaving these comparative-law considerations aside, in what follows we try to
shed some light on the reasons and implications of the dispute between the majority
opinions and the Fulford and Van den Wyngaert opinions.
4.2. Accessorial and derivative liability
Problematic in the control-theory is the use of the term ‘accessorial’ and the normative meaning attached to it. Consider the Katanga and Ngudjolo Conﬁrmation Decision with regard to indirect co-perpetration viz-a-vis ordering:
The leader’s ability to secure this automatic compliance with his orders is the basis
for his principal – rather than accessorial – liability. The highest authority does not
merely order the commission of a crime, but through his control over the organization,
essentially decides whether and how the crime would be committed.84

‘Accessorial liability’ is equated to ‘lesser liability’. This is confusing to the extent
that it does not comport with the empirical model of criminal participation where
‘accessorial’, as non-principal/accomplice liability, has no normative connotation.85
It merely indicates that liability is ‘derivative’, i.e. that liability depends on the
principal crime. Indeed, the modes of liability in Article 25(3)(b–d), by requiring
the crime to be at least attempted, and by criminalizing a contribution to a crime,
constitute forms of derivative liability. They differ from principal liability in subparagraph 25(3)(a), where ‘commission’ of a crime is deﬁned. Clearly Judge Van den
Wyngaert reasoned from an empirical approach to criminal participation when she
argued that the principal–accessory distinction in Article 25(3) of the ICC Statute is
merely ‘conceptual’ and that it should not translate to a ‘different legal treatment’.86
We agree with that position to the extent that the terminology in Article 25(3)
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Ibid., para. 518, emphasis added.
Originally, in felony law there was a normative distinction between principals in the ﬁrst degree (the
perpetrator/principal), principals in the second degree (secondary principal), and accessories before the
fact. The difference between secondary principals and an accessory before the fact, both of whom are
accomplices, was that the secondary principal was at the scene of the crime while the accessory was not.
The secondary principal was generally more closely involved in committing the crime than the accessory,
while the crime was physically committed by the principal in the ﬁrst degree. J. Dressler, ‘Reassessing the
Theoretical Underpinning of Accomplice Liability: New Solutions to an Old Problem’, (1985) 37 Hastings LJ
191, at 194–5. See Van Sliedregt, supra note 10, 112–16.
Para. 22.
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(b–d) cannot in itself be taken as a normative indication of lesser blameworthiness.
Support for this position can be taken from comparative criminal law; there is no
rule or theory that categorically links accessorial/non-principal liability to lesser
responsibility.87
Having said that, aiding and abetting in subparagraph (3)(c) can be regarded as less
blameworthy vis-à-vis joint perpetration in subparagraph (3)(a). Where accomplices
such as aiders and abettors are further removed from the centre of the commission
of the offence, their responsibility is reduced in comparison to perpetrators, and
consequently their punishment should be reduced as well. This interpretation of
aiding and abetting comports with the previously mentioned normative approach
to aiding and abetting in international jurisprudence.
In our view, the hierarchical distinction among four types of perpetrators and
accomplices, as proposed by the Lubanga Pre-Trial and Trial Chamber and the PreTrial Chamber in Katanga and Ngudjolo, does not adequately reﬂect the normative
relationship between these types of participant. Ordering, soliciting and inducing
others to commit crimes in subparagraph 3(b) is not necessarily less blameworthy
than indirectly perpetrating a crime as penalized in subparagraph (3)(a). Even Kai
Ambos, a staunch supporter of the control-theory and its (alleged) hierarchical
structure,88 admits that the hierarchy in Article 25(3) is ‘less evident with regard to
subparagraph (b) – especially with regard to ‘ordering’ which belongs structurally
and systematically to subparagraph (a)’.89
Moreover, it is highly questionable whether Article 25(3) is based on a single
coherent, normative theory of participation. Nothing in the drafting history of the
ICC suggests that Article 25(3) was to constitute a self-contained system of criminal
participation with a coherent doctrinal grounding. To the contrary, as the chairman
of the Working Group on General Principles recalls, drafting Article 25(3) posed
great difﬁculties to negotiate; eventually, a near-consensus was reached where there
would be one provision to cover the responsibility of principals and all other modes
of participation. Article 25(3) was to provide the Court with a range of modalities
from which to choose.90
Bearing in mind this ‘aggregate’ background of Article 25(3) of the ICC Statute, it
seems that Article 25(3) reﬂects elements of the normative and empirical approaches
to criminal participation without clearly distinguishing between the two. The fact
that Article 25(3)(a) provides for instances of intellectual perpetration does not make
it the sole theoretical grounding for the whole of Article 25. Nor does it relegate all
participants covered by subparagraphs (b–d) to lesser liability. The ICC, in forging
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Even in those systems that provide for a distinction between principals and accessories where labelling comes
with a sentence reduction, ‘principal liability’ may still be derivative/accessorial. For instance, co-perpetrators
in Dutch law have the status of accessories. Their liability rests on that of the physical perpetrator; they are
only liable when the crime is committed or attempted. They are punished as if they were principals (Art.
47(1) Dutch Penal Code: ‘Als daders van een strafbaar feit worden gestraft: 1zij die het feit plegen, doen plegen
of medeplegen’).
K. Ambos, Treatise on International Criminal Law, Vol. 1 Foundations and General Part (2013), 146–7.
Ibid. at 152–3.
As discussed in P. Saland, ‘International Criminal Law Principles’ in R. S. Lee (ed.), The International Criminal
Court: The Making of the Rome Statute, Issues, Negotiations, Results (1999), at 198.
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its path to identifying the responsibility of principals versus accessories, has been
too rigorous in drawing lines according to the vague legislative concepts embodied
in Article 25(3) of the ICC Statute.

5. C ONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
The fact that international courts adhere to a principal–accomplice classiﬁcation is
noteworthy, particularly since this labelling in international law does not result in
a mandatory mitigation or increase of sentences.91 The reason why the distinction
is cultivated may well be a desire to extend the status of principal in international
criminal law.92 Despite the noted lack of practical value, stigmatization through
attributing the status of principal is important because of the expressive value and
the denunciatory and educational function of conferring this status in international
criminal law.93 Making clear who masterminded crimes by referring to him/her as
the ‘principal’ who ‘commits’ crimes is important in communicating to victims and
the international community as a whole who was the ‘real’ culprit.94 Bearing this
purpose in mind, there is value in adopting a normative approach to conferring the
status of ‘principal’ (rather than accomplice) to persons who are the main concern of
international criminal law: the remote or intellectual perpetrators who use others
to commit crimes.
Yet the control-theory as developed by the ICC Pre-Trial Chambers and Trial
Chamber in the Lubanga and Katanga and Ngudjolo cases suffers from ambiguities
and wrongful assumptions. So far, the control-theory does not provide the limitation of liability that some expected it to bring.95 In current ICC jurisprudence,
co-perpetration and indirect co-perpetration are broad liability theories, suffering
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According to Arts. 77 and 78 of the ICC Statute the Court can impose any sentence (up to lifelong imprisonment) taking into account the gravity of the crime and the individual circumstances of the convicted person;
no distinction is made between forms of responsibility. This does not mean that in sentencing role-variance
does not play a role. Rule 145(1)(c) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICC stipulates that judges in
their determination of sentence give consideration to the ‘degree of participation of the convicted person’.
This accords with practice at the ICTY where the Appeals Chamber held that ‘the gravity of the offence, as
stipulated in Art. 24(2), requires judges to consider the crime for which the accused has been convicted, the
underlying criminal conduct in general, and the role of the offender in the commission of the crime (ergo
the degree of participation). Still, it is at the level of sentencing, not at conviction level, that the degree of
responsibility is expressed.
Consider in this respect F. Z. Giustianini’s paper on the ICTR’s Appeals Chamber’s ruling in Seromba where
a broad concept of ‘commission’ was adopted and where instigation would have been more appropriate.
According to F. Z. Giustanini this was to impose a severe and exemplary punishment on Seromba. F. Z. Giustanini, ‘Stretching the Boundaries of Commission Liability: The ICTR Appeals Judgment in Seromba’, (2008)
6 JICJ 783, at 798. See also G. Townsend, ‘Current Developments in the Jurisprudence of the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda’, (2005) 5 ICLR 147, at 156.
See M. A. Drumbl, Atrocity, Punishment and International Law (2007), 174. In sentencing practice, this translates
to attaching much weight to the sentencing purposes of retribution and deterrence. E.g. Prosecutor v. Delalić
et al., Judgement, Appeals Chamber, IT-96-21-A, 20 February 2001, para. 806; Prosecutor v. Serushago, Sentence,
Trial Chamber, ICTR 98-39-S, 5 February 1999, para 20; Prosecutor v. Tadić, Judgement in Sentencing Appeals,
Appeals Chamber, IT-94-1-A and IT-94-1-Abis, 26 January 2000, para. 48. See R. Henham, ‘Some Issues for
Sentencing in the International Criminal Court’, (2003) 52 ICLQ 81. Note also Section 5 of the preamble of
the ICC Statute, which comprises the aim to contribute to the prevention of international crimes.
See C. Kress, ‘Claus Roxins Lehre von der Organisationsherrschaft und das Völkerstrafrecht’, (2006) 153
Goltdammer’s Archiv für Strafrecht 304, at 308; Weigend, supra note 10, at 102–3.
See for instance Ambos, supra note 88, at 146.
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from unclear underlying tenets and a one-dimensional use of the concept of ‘control’.
Moreover, the alleged normative hierarchy of blameworthiness rests on a confusing
interpretation of ‘accessorial’ and takes the normative interpretation of Article 25(3)
of the ICC Statute too far. The authors hope the ICC Appeals Chamber takes this
unique opportunity to reconsider or improve the control-theory as developed by the
Pre-Trial Chambers in the Lubanga and Katanga and Ngudjolo cases.
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